MARKET INCENTIVES FOR SAFE COMMERCIAL AIRLINE OPERATION
研究航空事故后消费者需求变化是否构成安全激励，发现放松管制前几乎没有影响，近期事故后反应也较弱，且事故对航空公司股权价值的影响虽统计显著但远小于社会总成本。
Airlines are insured against most direct costs of an accident, but they cannot insure against demand loss. Some have argued that such consumer reaction will discipline unsafe operations. The authors' estimation of deviations from expected demand following accidents finds little or no effect prior to airline deregulation and weak indication of a response to recent crashes. These results are consistent with the changes the authors find in an airline's equity value following an accident, which are statistically significant, but quite small relative to the total social cost of the accident. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.