Consideration Sets and Competitive Marketing
研究了企业通过成本营销手段影响消费者考虑集的市场模型，发现均衡结果非竞争性但企业获得竞争性收益，且满足有效营销性质。
We study a market model in which competing firms use costly marketing devices to influence the set of alternatives that boundedly rational consumers perceive as relevant. Consumers in our model apply well-defined preferences to a “consideration set”, which is a subset of the feasible set and subject to manipulation by firms. We examine the implications of this behavioral model on otherwise competitive markets. In our model, the market equilibrium outcome is not competitive, yet firms earn competitive payoff because the strategic use of costly marketing devices wears off the collusive impact of consumers’ bounded rationality. Equilibrium behavior satisfies an “effective marketing property”: if a consumer considers a firm only because of a marketing device it employs, he ends up buying from that firm.