Firm Organization and the Economic Approach to Personnel Management
探讨代理理论和监督问题在人事管理中的应用，指出对非管理人员需先解决监督问题再设计激励合同，并以日本制造技术为例说明组织如何应对监督挑战。
There has been limited application of the large theoretical literature in the areas of agency and monitoring to personnel management issues. The research developing and testing implications of agency theory on the design of compensation contracts has focused on managerial labor contracts; the theory of monitoring has seen even fewer applications to the personnel literature. The premise of this paper is that while agency issues may be directly applicable to managerial labor, for nonmanagerial personnel the monitoring problem must be addressed preliminary to the design of incentive contracts. I first describe the role of commitment in monitoring problems. This is then applied to a discussion of the difference between penalties and rewards in motivating workers. The relative success of Japanese manufacturing techniques is then put in the context of an organizational attempt to solve the monitoring problem. I conclude by suggesting areas for future research.