Robust stability in matching markets
研究了学生与学校匹配问题中，机制同时满足稳定、防策略且能抵御学生先谎报偏好再阻挠匹配的联合操纵的性质，发现仅当学校优先级结构无环时存在稳健稳定机制，且学生最优稳定机制是唯一的。
In a matching problem between students and schools, a mechanism is said to be robustly stable if it is stable, strategy-proof, and immune to a combined manipulation, where a student first misreports her preferences and then blocks the matching that is produced by the mechanism. We find that even when school priorities are publicly known and only students can behave strategically, there is a priority structure for which no robustly stable mechanism exists. Our main result shows that there exists a robustly stable mechanism if and only if the priority structure of schools is acyclic (Ergin, 2002), and in that case, the student-optimal stable mechanism is the unique robustly stable mechanism.