The Limits of Monopolization Through Acquisition
研究竞争对手收购能否导致同质产品行业的完全或部分垄断，通过博弈模型分析发现，在简化假设下，收购垄断仅限于企业数量较少的行业，部分垄断可通过禁止收购超过50%企业来消除。
We address the question of whether competitive acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in complete or partial monopolization of a homogeneous product industry. This question is modeled in terms of two distinct three-stage noncoopera-tive games. Analysis of subgame perfect pure strategy Nash equilibria of these games discloses that, under simplifying assumptions, monopolization of an industry through acquisition is limited to industries with relatively few firms. Partial monopolization is either limited in scope or can be completely eliminated by prohibiting any owner from acquiring over 50 percent of the firms in the industry.