Post-entry Competition in the Plain Paper Copier Market
回顾施乐垄断结束后普通纸复印机市场的进入后竞争，用进入与进入阻止理论分析施乐行为及大量进入者涌入，并探讨技术竞争理论，对产业组织学者有参考价值。
This paper reviews events in the plain paper copier (PPC) market immediately after Xerox's monopoly ended. Xerox's behavior and that of a flood of PPC entrants are viewed through the lens of recent advances in the theory of entry and entry deterrence. The events of the early post-entry period also cast some interesting light on the theory of technological competition. The modern theory of entry deterrence rests on a simple, if not obvious, proposition. The (socially) worst industry performance is after entry, the more monopolies there will be, since the interests of the entrant and society are opposed once entry has occurred. A series of papers have considered endogenous changes in the of competition-monopolists who make their industry more competitive (conditional on entry) in order to deter potential entrants.' There are two distinct steps in the entry-deterrence argument. First, it must be possible for events during the monopoly period to affect postentry competition. Some intertemporal complication must be present, either in costs or in firm-specific demand, if the state of the industry at the time of entry is to form important conditions for competition. Second, the monopolist must find it profitable to manipulate the initial by some pre-entry action. The general theoretical questions of entry and deterrence have been cast in quite specific terms for the problem of technological competition. One view emphasizes the (Kenneth Arrow, 1962; Jennifer Reinganum, 1983; Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole). Because any innovation destroys some of the rents to older products and processes, incumbent monopolists have a smaller incentive to innovate than potential entrants. Another view (Richard Schmalensee, 1983; Richard Gilbert and David Newbery, 1982) points out that the incumbent's losses from entrant's innovation create a motive for preemptive R&D, product introduction, or patenting. If incumbents are leaders and entrants followers, the second view will hold independent of technology. Note that the difference is over the profitability of entry deterring strategies. In both views, the presence of valuable assets like patents or secrets provides the necessary intertemporal link. Events in the PPC market during the time of Xerox's monopoly did have a substantial impact on the nature of competition in the early postentry period. An Arrow effect is evident, as are other equilibrium explanations of Xerox's rapid decline. The alternative explanation that Xerox was fat is also considered below.