Revolving Door Lobbyists
研究美国前政府职员进入游说行业后，如何利用在政府服务期间积累的人脉关系获益。发现当与其有联系的参议员离任时，该说客的收入会下降24%，且这种影响是即时、持续且长期的。
Washington's “revolving door”––the movement from government service into the lobbying industry––is regarded as a major concern for policy-making. We study how ex-government staffers benefit from the personal connections acquired during their public service. Lobbyists with experience in the office of a US Senator suffer a 24 percent drop in generated revenue when that Senator leaves office. The effect is immediate, discontinuous around the exit period, and long-lasting. Consistent with the notion that lobbyists sell access to powerful politicians, the drop in revenue is increasing in the seniority of and committee assignments power held by the exiting politician.