Converters, Compatibility, and the Control of Interfaces
研究了当存在转换器时，原本不兼容技术的市场均衡采用情况，发现转换器可能使市场效率更差，且垄断企业有动机提高转换成本，为反竞争破坏接口标准提供了理论支持。
Converters, emulators, or adapters can often make one technology partially compatible with another.We analyze the equilibrium market adoption of otherwise incompatible technologies, when such converters are available, and the incentives to provide them.While market outcomes without converters are often inefficient, we find that, in plausible cases, the availability of converters can actually make matters worse.We also find that when one of the technologies is supplied only by a single firm, that firm may have an incentive to make conversion costly.This may lend some theoretical support to allegations of anticompetitive disruption of interface standards.