Effects of the Change from Rate-of-Return to Price-Cap Regulation
分析美国电话行业从传统回报率规制转向激励性规制（如价格上限）的原因与基本结构，说明这种转变如何促进生产效率并让企业分享社会收益。
This article focuses on the use of incentive regulation in the telephone industry in the United States. We first characterize some of the difficulties that have led regulators to move away from traditional rate-ofreturn (cost-based) regulation and toward systems of regulation that provide incentives for increasingly efficient production, allowing firms to share in the social gains from efficiency with increased profits. We then discuss the basic structure of incentive regulation as it has most commonly been adopted in the telephone industry in the United States. The first is price-cap (PC) regulation, which typically allows the firm to