The Economics of Product Patents
构建了一个产品专利模型，其中专利改变市场进入行为而非完全阻止进入，分析了专利制度和执法框架如何影响竞争对手的产品种类选择和市场均衡，并探讨了如何调整系统以改善社会福利。
This paper develops a model of product patents in which the patent changes the nature of market entry behavior rather than preventing entry entirely. The model incorporates three levels of action, namely, the innovator's patenting decision, the potential entrant's location decision, and possible court action. The analysis demonstrates how the characteristics of the patents system and the enforcement framework can influence rivals' variety choices and, thus, the market equilibrium. It also considers how the system can, in principle, be adjusted to improve social welfare. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.