Performance Incentives with Award Constraints
研究美国一个大型培训组织中约50个独立资金池的绩效奖金分配问题，分析奖金不能为负且总额受预算约束时，最优奖金函数如何依赖于机构数量、规模和绩效，并指出约束降低了激励系统的效率。
This paper studies the provision of incentives in a large U.S. training organization which is divided in about 50 independent pools of training agencies. The number and the size of the agencies within each pool vary greatly. Each pool distributes performance incentive awards to the training agencies it supervises, subject to two constraints: the awards cannot be negative and the sum of the awards cannot exceed an award budget. We characterize the optimal award function and derive simple predictions about how award prizes should depend on the number of agencies, on their sizes, and on their performances. Our results indicate that the constraints on the award distribution bind and reduce the overall e±ciency of the incentive system.