FDIC Improvement Act and corporate governance of commercial banks
研究了FDIC改进法案中关于银行审计委员会独立性和高管薪酬的条款，对比1990年银行与工业企业发现差异不大，但法案将促使银行审计委员会构成发生重大变化。
This paper examines provisions of the FDIC Improvement Act related to corporate governance of banks. These provisions focus on the composition and independence of the audit committee and on increased regulatory influence over executive compensation. The composition of audit committees for a sample of banking firms for 1990 is compared with those of industrial firms and with the provisions of FDICIA. The findings suggest only minor differences between banks and other firms; however, under FDICIA provisions, large changes in the composition of bank audit committees are likely. Provisions related to compensation have focused on CEOs. To address this issue, I compare the 1990 levels and factors explaining differences in CEO compensation for a sample of banks and industrial firms. The findings suggest that bank CEOs earn slightly less than their industrial counterparts and that cross-sectional differences in CEO compensation in banking and other industries are explained by similar factors.