Do Creditor Rights Increase Employment Risk? Evidence from Loan Covenants
利用断点回归设计，研究发现贷款契约违约后债权人获得加速、重组或终止贷款的权利时，企业会大幅裁员；裁员在融资摩擦大、员工议价能力弱的企业以及行业或宏观经济低迷时更严重。
ABSTRACT Using a regression discontinuity design, we provide evidence that there are sharp and substantial employment cuts following loan covenant violations, when creditors gain rights to accelerate, restructure, or terminate a loan. The cuts are larger at firms with higher financing frictions and with weaker employee bargaining power, and during industry and macroeconomic downturns, when employees have fewer job opportunities. Union elections that create new labor bargaining units lead to higher loan spreads, consistent with creditors requiring compensation when employees gain bargaining power. Overall, binding financial contracts have a large impact on employees and are an amplification mechanism of economic downturns.