Screening for Good Patent Pools through Price Caps on Individual Licenses
研究了专利池可能促进竞争或形成卡特尔的问题，提出对池外单个许可设定价格上限来筛选好的专利池，该方法无需信息且能应对不对称情况。
Patent pools reduce prices when selling complementary inputs to technologies, but can also effectively cartelize markets when involving substitutes. Independent licensing, by reintroducing competition, ensures that only good pools form when there are two patent holders involved. For larger pools, independent licensing needs to be complemented by other policy tools. We propose to constrain the royalties for the patents individually licensed outside the pool with price caps replicating the pool's sharing rule. This information-free screening device works with asymmetries, even when licensors try to stabilize pools by readjusting the sharing rule in a way that may not reflect contributions.