Exclusionary vertical restraints law: Has economics mattered?
分析经济学对排他性纵向关系反垄断法发展的影响，特别是后芝加哥学派排他性市场力量理论的接受情况，发现经济学影响法律但存在长期滞后和随机性。
I was asked to report on the effect of economics on the development of antitrust analysis of exclusionary vertical relationships, particularly on the current acceptance of post-Chicago theories of exclusionary market power such as raising rivals' costs (RRC). In order to better understand the role of economics in vertical-restraints law, however, I first analyze acceptance of the free-riding efficiency theory. This provides a second data set. In addition, since antitrust involves balancing market-power harms with efficiency benefits, a more complete picture is achieved. I have reached three basic tentative conclusions. First, developments in economics clearly have an effect on developments in the law. This has been true for both the free-rider and exclusionary-market-power theories. However, the process by which antitrust adopts new economic concepts seems to be subject to a long lag. Second, the process appears to be subject to considerable randomness. It appears to depend on the (partly) random draw of judges, lawyers, and economic consultants. Third, when economic theories are accepted, courts often restrict their engagement with the theories. Assertion sometimes is substituted for economic evidence, and legal conclusions sometimes are overly broad.