Dynamic limit pricing
研究单边不完全信息下的多期限制性定价模型，刻画了混同与分离均衡及其存在条件，发现随着时间跨度增加或企业耐心增强，限制性定价更难维持。
I study a multiperiod model of limit pricing under one‐sided incomplete information. I characterize pooling and separating equilibria and their existence and determine when these involve limit pricing. For some parameter constellations, the unique equilibrium surviving a D1 type refinement involves immediate separation on monopoly prices. For others, there are limit price equilibria surviving the refinement in which different types may initially pool and then (possibly) separate. Separation involves setting prices such that the inefficient incumbent's profits from mimicking are negative. As the horizon increases or as firms become more patient, limit pricing becomes increasingly difficult to sustain in equilibrium.