A Theory of Endogenous Coalition Structures
研究存在广泛外部性且可签订约束性协议时的联盟形成问题，通过定义基于划分函数的扩展式讨价还价博弈，证明平稳子博弈完美均衡的存在性，并刻画均衡联盟结构，尤其对对称划分函数给出唯一性定理，应用于古诺寡头市场。
Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive-form bargaining game. We establish the existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium for such a game. Our main results are concerned with the characterization of equilibriumcoalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain conditions) an equilibrium coalition structure. Our characterization results are especially sharp forsymmetricpartition functions. In particular, we provide a uniqueness theorem and apply our results to a Cournot oligopoly.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C71, C72, C78, D62.