Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: The Maghribi Traders' Coalition
研究11世纪马格里布商人如何通过联盟制度解决海外代理中的承诺问题，利用声誉机制和合同关系实现有效治理，对理解早期贸易制度有参考价值。
This paper presents an economic institution which enabled eleventh-century traders to benefit from employing overseas agents despite the commitment problem inherent in these relations. Agency relations were governed by a coalition--an economic institution in which expectations, implicit contractual relations, and a specific information-transmission mechanism supported the operation of a reputation mechanism. Historical records and a simple game-theoretical model are used to examine this institution. The study highlights the interaction between social and economic institutions, the determinants of business practices, the nature of the merchants' law, and the interrelations between market and nonmarket institutions. Copyright 1993 by American Economic Association.