The Dual Role of Demand Deposits under Asymmetric Information
研究了当借贷双方存在初始信息不对称时，银行接受可开支票存款能获取未来借款人质量信息，从而产生业务互补性，但其他融资方式的中介可与银行共存，且银行在均衡中零利润。
When there is initial asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers, accepting checkable deposits can give banks information about the quality of future borrowers. Hence, the two main types of bank activities are complementarities. Nevertheless, i t is shown that intermediaries who fund themselves by other means and, thus, do not get the same borrower information as banks, can coexist with banks in equilibrium. With the possibility of legally binding contingent contracts, banks earn zero expected profits in equilibriu m in spite of their information advantage relative to other intermediaries. If legally binding contingent contracts are infeasib le, there may exist an implicit contract equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.