Layoffs, Top Executive Pay, and Firm Performance
研究裁员与高管薪酬及股价的关系，发现裁员企业CEO薪酬更高，但控制企业固定效应后这一溢价消失，且裁员公告引发股价小幅下跌。
This paper examines the connection between layoffs, executive pay, and stock prices. Firms that announce layoffs in the previous year pay their CEOs more, and give their CEOs larger percentage raises than firms which do not have at least one layoff announcement in the previous year. However, the likelihood of announcing a layoff varies dramatically along other dimensions, for example firm size, which are also correlated with CEO pay. Once firm-specific fixed effects are controlled for, the CEO pay premium for laying off workers disappears. In addition, there is a small negative share price reaction to layoff announcements. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.