The bidder exclusion effect
提出一种检验竞标者估值与人数是否独立的新方法，通过估计随机排除一名竞标者带来的预期收入下降来判断，并用木材拍卖数据验证了该方法。
Abstract We introduce a new, simple‐to‐compute test of independence of valuations and the number of bidders for ascending button auctions with symmetric, conditionally independent private values. The test involves estimating the expected revenue drop from excluding a bidder at random, which can be computed as a scaled sample average of a difference of order statistics. This object also provides a bound on counterfactual revenue changes from optimal reserve pricing or bidder mergers. We illustrate the approach using data from timber auctions, where we find some evidence that bidder valuations and the number of participants are not independent.