A folk theorem for stochastic games with infrequent state changes
研究了当周期长度缩短但贴现率和状态转移率固定时，动态随机博弈中的完美公共均衡收益，给出了可行且个体理性收益集的定义，并在不完全监督下证明了民间定理。
We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoffs in dynamic stochastic games, in the case where the length of the period shrinks, but players' rate of time discounting and the transition rate between states remain fixed. We present a meaningful definition of the feasible and individually rational payoff sets for this environment, and we prove a folk theorem under imperfect monitoring. Our setting differs significantly from the case considered in previous literature (Dutta (1995), Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2011), and Hörner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2011)) where players become very patient. In particular, the set of equilibrium payoffs typically depends on the initial state.