Behavior, Human Capital and the Formation of Gangs
研究街头帮派中看似非理性的行为如何传递有价值的人力资本信号，构建分离均衡模型解释帮派成员与社会的巨大差异，并指出增加帮派成员外部机会可能减少帮派但使残留帮派更恶劣。
Behavior in dysfunctional social groups is often regarded by social scientists as irrational in nature. We focus on many features of behavior within the street gang, also noting the existence of other gang-like groups, and show how apparently irrational behavior can signal the possession of valuable human capital. We contend that gangs are formed around particular traits of direct value to the group, and therefore of indirect value to the gang member, and construct a model with a separating equilibrium consistent with the existence of a large gap between the characteristics of gang members and the rest of society. Policy implications include a deduction that increasing the opportunities for gang members outside of life in the gang, perhaps through offering an amnesty, might reduce gangs but will unambiguously make remaining gangs even nastier. Copyright © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.