Optimal Contracts for Experimentation
研究委托人如何设计长期合同来激励代理人进行实验，发现低能力代理人会因逆向选择和道德风险而实验不足，并给出了两种最优合同形式：奖金合同和追回合同。
This paper studies long-term contracts for experimentation in a principal-agent setting with adverse selection about the agent’s ability (pre-contractual hidden information), dynamic moral hazard, and private learning about project quality. We show that profit maximization by the principal generally leads to under-experimentation by an agent of low ability, even though there would be no distortion in the absence of either adverse selection or moral hazard. The structure of optimal contracts is shaped by a variety of considerations including dynamic agency costs and the possibility of post-contractual hidden information about project quality. We derive two explicit menus of contracts that can be used to implement the second best solution: “bonus contracts” and “clawback contracts”. Both feature history-contingent dynamic streams of transfers.