The Rise and Fall of Bank Control in the United States: 1890-1939
研究美国股权与公司控制权如何分离，分析1890年代银行通过并购控制企业，以及1912-1939年间政治反应导致银行控制衰退，并利用1914年股市数据估算银行退出董事会使公司价值下降约7%。
This article studies how equity ownership and corporate control were separated in the United States. Initially, railroads and industrial firms were tightly controlled by a few shareholders; this situation was altered in the 1890s by massive mergers and reorganizations, which allowed private banks to control railroads and industrial firms. Between 1912 and 1939, bank control faded away as a result of a political reaction against financial institutions. Using stock-market data from 1914, the author shows that the eviction of banks from corporate boards depressed firm values by about 7 percent and that part of this value came from cartelization. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.