An Equilibrium Model with Involuntary Unemployment at Flexible, Competitive Prices and Wages
构建了一个无瓦尔拉斯拍卖人的一般均衡模型，其中价格和工资由经济主体直接选择。模型存在多重子博弈完美均衡，包括瓦尔拉斯均衡以及工人因自我实现的预期而遭受配给、无法按现行工资出售全部劳动的非自愿失业情形。
This paper presents a general-equilibrium model in which all prices and quantities transacted are the direct choices of econom ic agents: there is no Walrasian auctioneer. Multiple subgame perfect equilibria exist with prices and wages at their Walrasian levels. Among the equilibrium allocations are the Walrasian ones, but there a re also outcomes in which price- and wage-taking workers are rationed in the labor market and are unable to sell all the labor they want a t the prevailing wage. This involuntary unemployment results from sel f-fulfilling expectations of inadequate excess demand as in some inte rpretations of Keynes's ideas. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.