Two axiomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism
研究了无货币转移且只有序数偏好的不可分物品随机分配问题，给出了概率序列机制的两种公理化刻画，证明它是唯一满足非浪费性和序数公平性的机制，也是唯一满足随机占优效率、随机占优无嫉妒和弱不变性或弱截断稳健性的机制。
This paper studies the problem of assigning a set of indivisible objects to a set of agents when monetary transfers are not allowed and agents reveal only ordinal preferences, but random assignments are possible. We offer two characterizations of the probabilistic serial mechanism, which assigns lotteries over objects. We show that it is the only mechanism satisfying non-wastefulness and ordinal fairness and the only mechanism satisfying sd-efficiency, sd-envy-freeness, and weak invariance or weak truncation robustness (where “sd stands for first-order stochastic dominance).