The cost of market versus regulatory discipline in banking
研究发现，受保存款融资使银行免于承担市场纪律的全部成本，穆迪评级下调时，依赖受保存款越多的银行负面异常回报越大，且银行在风险增加后会提高受保存款使用，质疑市场参与者有效约束银行行为的能力。
We present evidence that insured deposit financing shields banks from the full costs of market discipline. Moody's downgrades, indicators of increasing risk, are associated with negative abnormal equity returns that are increasing in the bank's reliance on insured deposits. Moreover, banks raise their use of insured deposits following increases in risk. These findings cast doubt on the ability of capital market participants to effectively discipline bank behavior within the current regulatory environment. More generally, our findings highlight the potential for regulation to undermine market discipline in regulated industries.