Institutional Activism Types and CEO Compensation: A Time-Series Analysis of Large Canadian Corporations †
基于多伦多证券交易所300家公司7年数据，研究了机构激进主义类型和董事会监督机制对CEO绩效薪酬的影响，发现代理投票型激进主义影响更强且更持久。
Using data from the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 companies for a 7-year period, the authors examine the role that institutional activism types and three salient board monitoring mechanisms— CEO/board chair split, board composition, and compensation committee independence—play in influencing CEO contingent compensation in Canada. The authors find that the effect of institutional activism, especially proxy based, is stronger on contingent CEO compensation and that its effects span a longer time. As opposed to the interactions of cumulative proxy-based activism with any of the three monitoring mechanisms, the interactions of cumulative non-proxy-based activism with both CEO/board chair split and compensation committee independence appear to influence CEO contingent compensation. The study's implications are given.