The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism in Germany
研究了德国监管变化后对冲基金入股弱治理、低盈利公司的影响，发现平均上提升了股东价值，但激进对冲基金的短期超额收益会反转，而非激进基金最终表现更好。
Abstract Recent regulatory changes in the German financial system shifted corporate control activities from universal banks to other capital market participants. Particularly hedge funds took advantage of the resulting control vacuum by acquiring stakes in weakly governed and less profitable firms. We document that, on average, hedge funds increased shareholder value in the short‐ and long‐run. However, more aggressive hedge funds generated only initially higher returns and their outperformance quickly reversed, whereas non‐aggressive hedge funds ultimately outperformed their aggressive peers. These findings suggest that aggressive hedge funds attempt to expropriate the target firm's shareholders by exiting at temporarily increased share prices .