Concerted Lending: Did Large Banks Bear the Burden?
建立了一个银行规模异质的博弈模型，发现小银行会搭大银行再贷款的便车。实证表明，在拉丁美洲危机期间，大银行股价对负面消息更敏感，验证了模型推论。
A game-theoretic model of lending with banks heterogeneous by size is introduced in which atomistic small banks free ride on the relending efforts of a large bank. An empirically-testable corollary conclusion suggests that news concerning the underlying economic condition of the debtor nation will have a greater impact on the large bank. This empirical prediction is validated for the Latin American Crisis period using evidence from long-term bond spread data. Poolings of cross-sectional time-series data reveal that the equity values of large banks are relatively more sensitive to adverse news concerning the quality of Latin American loans. Copyright 1992 by Ohio State University Press.