The Information Content of Quantity Signals and Downward Inflexible Prices
研究显示，当信息传播严重依赖价格灵活性时，企业间的非合作纳什竞争会导致非市场出清价格持续存在，因为价格固定时数量信号揭示的信息价值可能超过即时调价的短期利润。
It is shown that nonmarket-clearing prices can persist in noncooperative Nash competition among firms when the dis semination of information depends critically on the flexibility of pr ices. The key to this explanation is that the value of the informatio n revealed by quantity signals when prices are fixed can be greater t han the short-run profit obtained by an instantaneous price adjustmen t. Copyright 1987 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.