Strategic Delay in Bargaining with Two-Sided Uncertainty
分析无限期交替出价模型中买卖双方利用延迟来传递谈判实力信号，交易虽能实现但需付出延迟成本。
The role of strategic delay is analyzed in an infinite-horizon alternating-offer model of bargaining. A buyer and seller are engaged in the trade of a single object. Both bargainers have private information about their own preferences and are impatient in that delaying agreement is costly. An equilibrium is constructed in which the bargainers signal the strength of their bargaining positions by delaying prior to making an offer. A bargainer expecting large gains from trade is more impatient than one expecting small gains and, hence, makes concessions earlier on. Trade occurs whenever gains from trade exist, but only after costly delay. Copyright 1992 by The Review of Economic Studies Limited.