垄断中公共信息的价值

The Value of Public Information in Monopoly

Econometrica · 2001
被引 1
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

证明,向单一买家销售的非线性定价垄断者,总是倾向于承诺公开披露与买家估值相关的信息,即使买家价值影响卖家的机会成本时也成立。

Abstract

The logic of the linkage principle of Milgrom and Weber (1982) extends to price discrimination. A non-linear pricing monopolist who sells to a single buyer always prefers to commit to publicly reveal information affiliated to the valuation of the buyer. This is also valid when the value of the buyer affects the opportunity cost of the seller.

公共信息价值垄断非线性定价关联原则