Property Rights and X-Efficiency: Reply
作者回应Leibenstein对X效率的辩护，重申将交易成本和产权结构纳入新古典理论后，该框架已涵盖X效率的解释力，并强调产权是影响决策者机会集的变量而非独立理论。
Recently (1983), I assessed the relative merits of X-efficiency and of neoclassical economic theory generalized to include the constraints imposed by transaction costs and the structure of rights. On both theoretical and empirical grounds, I concluded that such a generalization encompassed whatever limited explanatory power X-efficiency had to offer. Harvey Leibenstein's comment (1983) sharpens his presentation of X-efficiency and, in my view, highlights the limitations of that construct.' Because the main points he raises were already addressed in my original article, further discussion would be repetitive. Leibenstein, however, seems to misinterpret several key aspects of my analysis. Accordingly, it is useful to restate these points to avoid misunderstanding by other readers and to facilitate assessment of the positions at issue. Neoclassical economic theory, defined as the utility-maximization theory of the consumer and the wealth-maximization theory of the firm, assumed-inter alia-that all rights to the use of resources were fully allocated, privately held, and exchanged at zero information and transaction costs. By the late 1950's, empirical studies began to reveal some serious limitations of this framework and stimulated a variety of proposed reforms. Different lines of research eventually led to the generalization of neoclassical theory to include the explicit consideration of transaction costs and the structure of rights. This approach has turned out to be extremely fruitful. Not only has it reconciled the theory with broad classes of previously unexplained phenomena, but it has opened the way for important new applications. In particular, it has allowed extension of the utility-maximization hypothesis to all choices (i.e., by household, business, and government decision makers) subject to constraints. This advance has ended the dichotomy between the theory of consumer choice and the theory of the firm, and has established a more powerful framework for investigating the organization of economic activity. Thus, for example, analysis of the shirking-information problem of team production is offering new insights into why firms exist. Indeed, it is providing a new perspective on vertical integration, occasioning a major reappraisal of antitrust policies; on the circumstances affecting the choice of business organization, including single proprietorships, partnerships and other profit-sharing arrangements, corporations, nonprofits, and government-owned firms; and on the economic consequences of alternative ownership arrangements. Both theory and evidence indicate that the choice of organizational form and the rules adopted within it depend crucially not only on transaction costs, but also on the formal legal system as well as on the work ethic, customs, conventions, and other components of a society's system of rights. Transaction costs and the system of rights simply belong to the group of variables that determine the opportunity set faced by a utility-maximizing decision maker. It follows that property rights, like transaction costs, is not a theory (it is a variable that enters economic theory); it is not a motivational force (other than in the sense that it affects the opportunity set); it does not imply that individuals act to fully maximize wealth given the limits of their rights (its most distinguishing feature is the insistence upon the universal applicability of *Law and Economics Center, University of Miami, P.O. Box 248000, Coral Gables, FL 33124. I am indebted to Roger E. Meiners and Robert J. Staaf for helpful comments. 'Leibenstein's statement that I should have considered other alternative approaches, including Williamson's, is mystifying. First, I was not writing a review of the literature. Second, Williamson's work is a major keystone of the analysis I presented. My paper contained several statements to that effect plus repeated references to his writings.