A Dynamic Model of Union Power, Wages and Employment
构建了一个动态模型，研究工会权力形式对工资和就业的影响，发现工会密度与工资、就业呈非单调关系，并解释了工会长期存续的条件。
The traditional approach to modeling the effects of trade union power on wages and employment has paid very little attention to how the form of union power affects the outcome. In this paper, wage and employment determination is considered in a dynamic model where some workers, e.g. non-union members, continue to work in the event of a dispute to see whether this practice can be justified. The predictions of the model are very different from the standard one, for example both wages and employment may be a non-monotonic function of union density. The model can also explain situations in which unions are sustainable in the long run. Copyright 1993 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.