An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
针对完全监测和贴现的双人重复博弈，提出一种高效算法来计算所有纯策略子博弈完美均衡的支付对集合，该算法比现有实现效率更高，并证明均衡支付集的极值点数量有限。
Consider repeated two-player games with perfect monitoring and discounting. We provide an algorithm that computes the set V* of payoff pairs of all pure-strategy subgame perfect equilibria with public randomization. The algorithm provides significant efficiency gains over the existing implementations of the algorithm from Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990). These efficiency gains arise from a better understanding of the manner in which extreme points of the equilibrium payoff set are generated. An important theoretical implication of our algorithm is that the set of extreme points E of V* is finite. Indeed, |E| ≤ 3|A|, where A is the set of action profiles of the stage game.