Court Enforcement, Bank Loans, and Firm Investment: Evidence from a Bankruptcy Reform in Brazil*
利用巴西各市民事法院拥堵程度的差异及一项加强有担保债权人保护的破产改革，研究发现法院拥堵程度较低地区的企业在改革后更多地使用有担保贷款、增加投资和产出，表明法院执行效率影响金融改革对企业融资和投资的效果。
Abstract We exploit variation in the congestion of civil courts across Brazilian municipalities, together with a bankruptcy reform increasing secured creditors’ protection, to estimate the effect of enforcement on firm access to finance, investment, and size. We find that firms operating in municipalities with less congested courts experienced a larger increase in the use of secured loans, as well as a larger increase in investment and value of output in the years after the reform. To establish the direction of causality, we use an instrumental variable strategy that exploits Brazilian state laws on judicial organization, and focus on differences in court congestion across otherwise similar neighboring municipalities located across judicial district borders within the same state. The evidence indicates that differences in court enforcement affect the impact of financial reform on firm access to finance, investment, and size.