Unemployment Insurance and Union Wage Setting
研究了在工会管理失业保险的北欧模式下，不同融资方式对就业的影响，发现一次性拨款增加就业，边际补贴效果不确定，工资税无影响，利润税明确增加就业。
The authors examine alternative systems of financing unemployment insurance benefits in an economy with wage-sett ing unions, where, as in some Nordic countries, each union runs its o wn unemployment insurance system. It is shown that a higher lump-sum grant to the union's unemployment insurance fund increases employment , whereas higher marginal subsidies have ambiguous effects. An unempl oyment insurance tax on wages has no effect on employment, whereas an unemployment insurance tax on profits unambiguously increases employ ment. The authors also analyze a case where wages are set at the firm level and premiums at the industry level. Copyright 1988 by The editors of the Scandinavian Journal of Economics.