A Financial Contracting Approach to the Role of Supermarkets in Farmers' Credit Access
构建金融契约模型，分析超市在向农民提供贷款时同时进行监督和咨询服务，发现这能改善小农户信贷获取，但有时也会导致过度监督。
Traditional moneylenders monitor farmers to ensure that their investment is not diverted. Modern farming contracts offered by supermarkets in developing countries often entail a loan component, and monitoring arises as well. However, unlike moneylenders, supermarkets do care about the attributes of the product. Whether such attributes are obtained is influenced largely by the advice and the extension services received by farmers. We build a financial contracting model where we show that supermarkets optimally undertake both the monitoring and the advisory missions. This contract is shown to potentially enhance credit access for small farmers but sometimes also involves excessive monitoring.