Heterogeneity, Demand for Insurance, and Adverse Selection
论文整合了需求摩擦对保险选择的影响，指出异质性摩擦导致购买者支付意愿偏高、未购买者偏低，并分析了这一发现如何改变对逆向选择市场的福利评估及补贴、强制保险等政策的有效性判断。
Recent evidence underlines the importance of demand frictions distorting insurance choices. Heterogeneous frictions cause the willingness to pay for insurance to be biased upward (relative to value) for those purchasing insurance, but downward for those who remain uninsured. The paper integrates this finding with standard methods for evaluating welfare in insurance markets and demonstrates how welfare conclusions regarding adversely selected markets are affected. The demand frictions framework also makes qualitatively different predictions about the desirability of policies, such as insurance subsidies and mandates, commonly used to tackle adverse selection.