Is It Legitimate to Encourage Work Sharing?
扩展了Mirrlees的所得税模型，考虑工人资质内生且政府可观测，发现最优税收不仅取决于收入还取决于工资率和劳动供给，并给出了补贴低资质或鼓励工作分享的条件。
A generalization of Mirrlees' income taxation model is formulated in which qualifications of workers are both endogenous and observable by the government. Individuals differ by their unobservable abilities, which simultaneously affect their disutility of labor and their cost of training. In general the optimal tax schedule depends not only on income but also on its .'components, i.e., wage rate (or qualification) and labor supply. We find conditions under which it is optimal to subsidize lower qualifications or to encourage work sharing.