Voluntary Donations and Public Expenditures in a Federal System
分析新联邦主义下非营利组织和地方政府能否完全抵消联邦社会服务支出削减，通过竞争博弈模型考察捐赠动机和选民认知对均衡的影响，发现部分替代是最可能的结果。
Proponents of the new federalism argue that nonprofit organizations and local governments will fully offset federal social service expenditure cutbacks. The author analyzes this proposition as a competitive game in which donations are motivated by private and public good considerations. The author characterizes the response of political-economic equilibrium to exogenous changes in federal expenditures when local voters are cognizant of donor reactions. Partial replacement is the most likely outcome, though others are possible. Copyright 1987 by American Economic Association.