The Effect of Annuity Insurance and Savings and Inequality
通过比较完美与不完美保险安排下的储蓄行为，研究寿命不确定性导致的预防性储蓄和财富不平等，发现完善年金保险可降低储蓄并影响不平等。
This paper examines the amount of precautionary savings and wealth inequality arising from life-span uncertainty by comparing saving behavior under perfect insurance arrangements with that arising under imperfect arrangements, namely, when longevity risk can be pooled only with members of one's own family. The central findings of the paper are: (1) perfecting insurance arrangements can lower savings in intergenerationally altruistic and life-cycle economies and (2) in altruistic economies perfecting annuity insurance can influence in-equality; indeed, in the long run in the model, switching from imperfect family insurance to perfect insurance can mean the difference between absolute inequality and absolute equality. Copyright 1986 by University of Chicago Press.