Anticompetitive Vertical Integration by a Dominant Firm
分析主导企业向后垂直整合进入上游竞争行业，导致投入品和产出品价格上升，并给出一个基于市场份额和已有垂直整合程度的简单指标，用于判断这种整合是否改善社会福利。
Backward vertical integration by a dominant firm into an upstream competitive industry causes both input and output prices to rise. The dominant firm's advantage may or may not offset the negative effect of higher prices on social welfare. Whether it does depends on a simple indicator derived from input and output market shares and the degree of prior vertical integration. A vertical merger is similar to a hypothetical horizontal merger, suggesting that vertical merger policy for this industry should be similar to horizontal merger policy. The dominant firm model yields an observable sufficient indicator of welfare-improving vertical mergers. Copyright 1998 by American Economic Association.