Common Value Auctions with Default: An Experimental Approach
实验研究允许竞拍者违约的共同价值拍卖，发现违约使竞拍者出价更激进，但理论上对拍卖方有利的结果在实践中并未出现，可能与赢家诅咒有关。
Abstract This paper examines a common value auction in which bidder default is explicitly allowed. The lack of contractual enforcement has implications for the formation of bids as well as the revenue properties of the auction. Using a common value procurement auction, we explore these implications in an experimental setting. Our results show that bidders are more aggressive when default is allowed. A theoretical result shows that allowing default can actually be in the best interest of the auctioneer. Experimental evidence, however, indicates that this result does not hold true in practice. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that the data in our experiments is consistent with winner's curse behavior.