Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
研究只有一个长期参与者的博弈中，其阶段博弈策略被对手不完全观察时的声誉效应，给出了长期参与者收益的下界和上界，并证明当策略可被统计识别时，上下界随贴现因子趋近1而收敛于斯塔克尔伯格收益。
This paper studies reputation effects in games with a single long-run player whose choice of stage-game strategy is imperfectly observed by his opponents. We obtain lower and upper bounds on the long-run player's payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the game. If the long-run player's stage-game strategy is statistically identified by the observed outcomes, then for generic payoffs the upper and lower bounds both converge, as the discount factor tends to 1, to the long-run player's Stackelberg payoff, which is the most he could obtain by publicly committing himself to any strategy.