Reverse Auctions to Innovate Procurement Processes: Effects of Bid Information Presentation Design on a Supplier's Bidding Outcome
研究了信息技术驱动的逆向拍卖中，两种投标信息呈现方式（完全价格可见与部分价格可见）如何影响供应商的投标结果，并考虑了成本确定性和供应商议价能力的作用。
ABSTRACT Information technologies (ITs) are being used to innovate various procurement processes. This research study focuses on the supplier‐side effects of IT design choices to conduct reverse auctions, which are increasingly used to procure a wide range of products and services. IT–enabled reverse auctions enhance supplier participation across geographical boundaries, leading to more efficient pricing. However, there are growing concerns about the adverse effects of IT–enabled reverse auctions on a supplier's performance. Supplier‐side issues are gaining prominence in the reverse auction literature and are critical for the long‐term success of reverse auctions. Therefore, we focus on suppliers’ bidding outcomes and assess how the design of an IT–enabled reverse auction facilitates the auction bidding outcomes of participating suppliers. Specifically, we examine the effects of two types of bid information presentation design—full price visibility and partial price visibility—on supplier's auction bidding outcomes, across auctions with different cost certainty and suppliers bargaining power vis‐à‐vis the buyer. The results of this study contribute new knowledge about the ways to use IT for creating effective auction designs and innovating procurement through auctions to enhance both the buyer's and suppliers’ performance. We present the detailed theoretical contributions of our study and discuss the managerial implications for designers of reverse auctions.