The Role of Lawyer-Legislators in Shaping the Law: Evidence from Voting on Tort Reforms
研究了美国国会和州立法机构中律师背景的立法者，发现他们比非律师立法者更不支持限制侵权诉讼的改革，但更倾向于支持扩展侵权法的法案，且这一现象在任期受限的律师立法者中尤为明显。
Attorneys elected to the US Congress and to state legislatures are systematically less likely to vote in favor of tort reforms that restrict tort litigation but more likely to support bills that extend tort law than are legislators with different professional backgrounds. This finding is based on the analysis of 64 roll call votes at the federal and state levels between 1995 and 2014. It holds when controlling for legislators’ ideology and is particularly strong for term-limited lawyer-legislators. The empirical regularity is consistent with the hypothesis that lawyer-legislators, at least in part, pursue their private interests when voting on tort issues. Our results highlight the relevance of legislators’ identities and individual professional interests for economic policy making.