Sunk Capital and Negotiated Resolutions of Environmental Conflicts
研究两个国家在控制跨境工业污染时，沉没资本如何影响合作谈判：若沉没资本投资过大，可能无法达成比非合作更优的产量配额；即使合作可行，产量也会高于无沉没资本时，且双方会策略性投资以影响协议条款。
Two nations seek a cooperative agreement to control bilateral flows of an industrial pollutant. From previous noncooperative production choices, the nations hold a certain amount of sunk capital. If production requires relatively large investments in sunk capital, the nations may find that they cannot negotiate production quotas that improve on their noncooperative choices. When the nations find cooperation worthwhile, negotiated levels of production will be higher than in the absence of sunk capital. Furthermore, both nations are motivated to attempt to manipulate the terms of the agreement by making strategic investments in sunk capital prior to its completion.